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ABSTRACT 
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of habit derived from pragmatism and Veblenian institutional economics. Processes of 
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Institutions and Individuals: Interaction and Evolution 
Geoffrey M. Hodgson 
The relationship between social structure and individual agency is one of the central problems 
in social theory. Sometimes described otherwise, such as the rivalry between accounts based 
on „situation‟ or „disposition‟, it pervades methodological discussion in organization studies 
and elsewhere.1 It has major implications for theoretical and empirical research. However, 
there have been attempts by post-modernists and post-structuralists to dismiss or transcend 
this issue. In response, Nicos Mouzelis (1995, pp. 69-70) assessed „attempts to dismiss the 
agency-structure distinction ... either by conflating the two notions, or by ... deriving the one 
from the other‟ as leading to a theoretical impasse. Notably, many of these evasive attempts 
involve „the reintroduction of the distinction by the back door ... by keeping the logic of the 
agent-structure dichotomy while expressing it through a different terminology‟. The solution 
to the agency-structure problem is not to walk away from it, or to pretend it does not exist. 
Such strategies have notably ended up with the readmission of the problem in another form. 
This essay takes the agency-structure problem as axiomatic and takes a fresh look at some 
of the issues. Two major lines of argument are emphasized. The first involves a critique of 
what is sometimes described as methodological individualism, involving reductionist claims 
that structures, institutions or organizations must be analyzed largely or wholly in terms of 
individuals and their properties. 
The second line of argument involves a radical transformation of the conception of the 
human agent, in contrast to prevailing conceptions in both mainstream economics and 
sociology. Taking inspiration from pragmatist philosophy and psychology, and from the 
institutional economics of Thorstein Veblen (1914, 1919), habit is reinstated as a core 
dispositional mechanism underlying actions and beliefs.2 As demonstrated below, this has 
important implications for the agency-structure problem. 
Before these arguments are developed some terminological issues require attention. What is 
the difference between structures, institutions, conventions and organizations? As elaborated 
elsewhere (Hodgson, 2006), these terms are used in the following way: 
 Social structures include all sets of social relations, including the episodic and those 
without rules, as well as social institutions. 
 Institutions are systems of established and embedded social rules that structure social 
interactions. 
                                                 
1 The author is very grateful to Howard Aldrich, Markus Becker, Thorbjørn Knudsen and Jan-Willem Stoelhorst 
for comments on a previous draft of this paper. 
2 The origins and evolution of Veblenian institutional economics are set out in Hodgson (2004). This essay 
makes use of some material from that book. 
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 Rules in this context are understood as socially transmitted and customary normative 
injunctions or immanently normative dispositions, that in circumstances X do Y. 
 Conventions are particular instances of institutional rules. 
 Organizations are special institutions that involve (a) criteria to establish their 
boundaries and to distinguish their members from non-members, (b) principles of 
sovereignty concerning who is in charge and (c) chains of command delineating 
responsibilities within the organization. 
According to these definitions, organizations are a subset of the set of institutions, and 
institutions are a subset of the set of social structures.3 An example of a social structure that is 
not an institution is a demographic structure (Archer, 1995). Because of their established and 
relatively durable nature, institutions are the most general social structures relevant to the 
discussion here. Language is an example of an institution that is not an organization. The rule 
that infinitives should not be split is a convention within the institution of the English 
language. Every business firm is simultaneously an organization, institution and structure. 
The additional features that are definitional for organizations are not central to the main 
argument here but they are nevertheless very important for understanding interactions 
between organizations and individuals. I shall briefly mention some of the implications of 
these additional features towards the end of this essay. 
Eight sections follow. Sections 1-4 review concepts that are familiar in social theory, but 
are still widely disputed. They are important to prepare the ground for the distinctive 
contribution in the final sections. Sections 1-2 criticize methodological individualism and 
methodological collectivism respectively. Section 3 defines and criticizes reductionism. 
Section 4 reviews the work of Giddens, which attempts to surpass both methodological 
individualism and methodological collectivism. Section 5 examines some problems in critical 
realism, which lead to the crucial concept of habit promoted in section 6. In sections 6-7 it is 
shown that habits provide a mechanism of „reconstitutive downward causation‟ through which 
social circumstances can affect individual purposes and preferences. The concluding section 
draws out some implications for the social sciences in general and organization studies in 
particular. 
1. Problems with Methodological Individualism 
Typically, methodological individualists propose that social structures, institutions, and other 
collective phenomena should be explained in terms of the individuals involved.4 However, 
there is far from agreement on the precise definition of this term (Udéhn, 2001). 
Consider some examples. For the Austrian School economist Ludwig Lachmann (1969, p. 
94) methodological individualism means „that we shall not be satisfied with any type of 
                                                 
3 Searle (2005) has a different definition of institutions but there is some consonance with his approach. Ostrom 
(2005) provides a forensic discussion of the nature of rules. Hodgson (2006) demonstrates that Douglass North 
regards organizations as institutions, contrary to a widespread misinterpretation. 
4 Note that methodological individualism is about explanation. It is different from ontological individualism, 
which would involve the statement that „society consists of individuals‟, and from political individualism, which 
emphasizes individual rights. 
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explanation of social phenomena which does not lead us ultimately to a human plan.‟ But 
very few social scientists would deny the role of individual intentions in the explanation of 
social phenomena. 
In another attempt Jon Elster (1982, p. 453) defines methodological individualism as „the 
doctrine that all social phenomena (their structure and their change) are in principle explicable 
only in terms of individuals – their properties, goals, and beliefs.‟ Being less banal, this 
definition also is insufficiently precise, as it fails to clarify whether interactions between 
individuals or social structures are „properties … of individuals‟ or not. If individual 
interactions or social structures are not „properties of individuals‟, then this narrower and 
more meaningful notion of methodological individualism must be deemed inoperable, for the 
reasons given below. On the other hand, if individual interactions or social structures are 
among the „properties of individuals‟ then Elster‟s statement is acceptable. The only question 
is why this is described as „individualism‟ when the „properties of individuals‟ also include 
structures. 
Overall, much of the confusion in the debate over methodological individualism stems from 
whether methodological individualism means one or other of the following: 
(a) social phenomena should be explained entirely in terms of individuals alone; and  
(b) social phenomena should be explained in terms of individuals plus relations between 
individuals. 
The first of these versions (a) has never been achieved in practice, for reasons given below. 
By contrast, the problem with the second version (b) is that not that it is wrong but the term 
„methodological individualism‟ is unwarranted. Let us expand on these arguments, taking 
each version in turn. 
Why has the explanatory reduction to individuals alone in version (a) never been achieved? 
Neoclassical economics may claim to have achieved such a reduction. However, leading 
economist and Nobel Laureate Kenneth Arrow (1994) denies this, by pointing out that the 
price mechanisms in neoclassical theory involve social interactions and structures, and social 
phenomena that cannot be reduced entirely to individuals alone. Arrow (1994, pp. 4-5) 
remarked „economic theories require social elements as well even under the strictest 
acceptance of standard economic assumptions … individual behavior is always mediated by 
social relations. These are as much part of the description of reality as in individual behavior.‟ 
All versions of social contract theory involve individuals communicating with others or, at 
least, adopting tacit presumptions of the intentions and stances of others. All such interactions 
presume rules of interaction or interpretation. Communication involves some form of 
language, and languages by their nature are systems of rules. Hence social contract theory and 
general equilibrium theory both presume structured relations between individuals, rather than 
individuals in isolation. 
Individual choice requires a conceptual framework to make sense of the world. The 
reception of information by an individual requires a paradigm or cognitive frame to process 
and make sense of that information. The acquisition of this cognitive apparatus involves 
processes of socialization and education, involving extensive interaction with others (Mead, 
1934; Fleck, 1979; Douglas, 1986; Hodgson, 1988; Bogdan, 2000). The means of our 
understanding of the world are necessarily acquired through social relationships and 
interactions. Cognition is a social as well as an individual process. Individual choice is 
impossible without these institutions and interactions. 
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Alexander Field (1979) has shown that attempts by economists to explain the origin of 
social institutions always presume individuals acting in a particular context, with rules of 
behaviour governing their interaction. In the presumed „state of nature‟ from which 
institutions are seen to have emerged, a number of weighty rules, structures and cultural and 
social norms have already been (implicitly or explicitly) assumed. Accordingly, with 
explanations of the origin of institutions through game theory, Field pointed out that several 
constraints norms and rules must inevitably be presumed at the start. There can be no games 
without constraints or rules, and thus game theory can never explain the elemental constraints 
or rules themselves. Even in a sequence of repeated games, or of games about other (nested) 
games, at least one game or meta-game, with a structure and payoffs, must be assumed at the 
outset. 
Similarly, Kyriakos Kontopoulos (1993, p. 79) noted that „a methodological individualist 
strategy necessarily incorporates references to social relations‟. As these critics have showed, 
claimed methodological individualists never start from individuals alone. For example, Steven 
Lukes (1973, pp. 121-2) shows that in the claimed „methodological individualism‟ of Karl 
Popper (1945), „the social phenomena have not really been eliminated; they have been swept 
under the carpet‟. We always have to assume relations between individuals, as well as 
individuals themselves, to get anywhere. 
The proposition that explanations cannot be reduced to individuals alone has now taken 
hold in the new institutional economics, notably in the work of Masahito Aoki (2001). He 
argues that always and unavoidably, analysis must start from individuals plus some 
institutions, however primitive. 
The narrow methodological individualist has a problem of infinite regress: attempts to 
explain each emergent layer of institutions always rely on previous institutions and rules. 
These in turn have to be explained. The above arguments show that attempts to start simply 
from individuals must actually start from individuals plus social structures. 
All theories must first build from elements which are taken as given. However, the 
particular problems identified here undermine any claim that the explanation of the 
emergence of institutions can start from some kind of institution-free ensemble of (rational) 
individuals in which there is supposedly no rule or institution to be explained. Consequently, 
the project to explain the emergence of institutions on the basis of given individuals runs into 
difficulties, particularly with regard to the conceptualization of the initial state of nature from 
which institutions are supposed to emerge. 
Let us now turn to the broader version (b) of methodological individualism. The critique 
here is brief but no less devastating. Social structures are typically defined as interactive 
relations between individuals. These interactive relations may include social positions filled 
by individuals (such as prime minister, production manager, or sales representative). A social 
position is a specified social relationship with other individuals or social positions, which 
might in principle be occupied by alternative individuals. When an individual occupies a 
social position, he or she brings not only his or her own qualities or powers, but acquires 
additional qualities or powers associated with that position. Given this broad conception of 
social structure as interactive relations, (b) is definitionally equivalent to: 
(b+) social phenomena should be explained in terms of individuals and social structures. 
The problem becomes one of labels rather than content. Although (b) and (b+) are 
acceptable statements, there is no good reason why they should be described as 
methodological individualism. It would be equally legitimate to describe them as 
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„methodological structuralism‟ or „methodological institutionalism‟. All such descriptions are 
misleading. We always have to start from structures and individuals. There is no other viable 
explanatory strategy. 
2. Problems with Methodological Collectivism 
Because we always have to start from structures and individuals, prominent versions of 
„methodological collectivism‟ and „holism‟ have similarly to be rejected. Explanations 
entirely in terms of structures, cultures, or institutions are inadequate because they remove 
individual agency, and overlook the diverse characteristics among individuals in a population. 
If by contrast explanations are required to be in terms of structures and individuals, then we 
are back to a statement similar to (b+) above, and the description of this position as 
„methodological collectivism‟ is equally one-sided and misleading. 
Definitions of methodological collectivism are as problematic as those of methodological 
individualism. Examples or hints of methodological collectivism are found in Marxism, in the 
sociology of Émile Durkheim, and in structuralist or functionalist sociology. Defenders of 
Karl Marx point out that he acknowledged the role of the individual. Nevertheless, there are 
some highly misleading passages. For example, in a section of the German Ideology written 
in the 1840s, Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (1976, p. 59) wrote: „The ruling ideas are 
nothing more than the ideal expressions of the dominant material relations‟. The pitfall here is 
that ideas and volitions could be seen simply as expressions of the „material relations‟ of the 
social structure. In the first volume of Capital Marx (1976, p. 989) described how the actions 
of the capitalist are „no more‟ than the manifestation of capitalist structures. Similarly, in the 
third volume of Capital. Marx (1981, pp. 1019-20, emphasis added) wrote: 
The principal agents of this mode of production itself, the capitalist and the wage-
labourer, are as such simply embodiments and personifications of capital and wage-
labour – specific social characters that the social production process stamps on 
individuals, products of these specific social relations of production. 
The problem here is that explanations of individual agency seem to be conflated entirely upon 
„material relations‟ and „social structures‟, without recognition of individual diversity, cultural 
variation or discretionary possibilities. Although multiple interpretations of these passages are 
possible, Marx did not do enough to guard against a methodological collectivist interpretation. 
Turning to Durkheim, he wrote in 1897: 
We believe it is a fruitful idea that social life must be explained not by the conception of 
it formed by those who participate in it, but by the profound causes which escape their 
consciousness. We also think that these causes must be sought mainly in the way in 
which individuals associating together are formed in groups. (Durkheim, 1982, p. 171) 
A problem with this statement is that it does not explain how associations of individuals in 
groups explain social phenomena. Durkheim failed to elaborate and took refuge in 
unelaborated metaphorical phrases, such as „collective forces‟ and „social currents‟. Durkheim 
(1982, p. 59, emphasis removed) defined his basic concept of the „social fact‟: 
The social fact is any way of acting, whether fixed or not, capable of exerting over the 
individual an external constraint … which is general over the whole of a given society 
whilst having an existence of its own, independent of its individual manifestations. 
 - 6 - 
But there is a big difference between seeing such emergent phenomena as independent of any 
one individual, or external to all individuals. Again the quotation is ambiguous. Durkheim 
sometimes slid towards a methodological collectivism, where society and „social forces‟ 
somehow stand above and manipulate all individuals. 
Crucially, like Marxism, Durkheimian sociology lacks a developed micro-theory of how 
social structures affect, and are affected by, individual purposes or dispositions. Marx seemed 
to make psychology redundant, by declaring that the human essence was nothing more than 
the „ensemble of the social relations‟. More explicitly, Durkheim (1982, p. 129) banned 
psychology from social science with his famous declaration that „every time a social 
phenomenon is directly explained by a psychological phenomenon, we may rest assured that 
the explanation is false.‟ The consequences of such neglects or prohibitions are highly 
damaging for social theory. 
Both Durkheim and Marx lacked an adequate account of how individual dispositions are 
moulded. Such accounts must necessarily include psychological mechanisms. In their absence 
the temptation is to place the emphasis on social constraints, rather than on the additional 
reconstitution of individuals themselves. Explanations thus devolve to structures alone. 
Many social theorists have criticized methodological collectivism for making the individual 
the mere puppet of social forces. In addition, it is argued here that the main problem is that 
methodological collectivism not only diminishes the individual, but also pays insufficient 
attention to the processes and mechanisms by which the individual is fundamentally altered. 
One consequence of conflating the individual into the structure is to lose sight, not simply of 
the individual, but also of the mechanisms of social power and influence that may help to 
reconstitute individual purposes or preferences. It may appear paradoxical, but only by 
rescuing the individual from its conflation into the social, can the social determination of 
individuality be fully appreciated. 
Part of the solution is to bring psychology back into the picture. But strangely this is absent 
from much of social theory. There is very little psychology in Marxism, partly because the 
subject was so underdeveloped during Marx‟s time. Durkheim himself bears part of the 
responsibility for the exclusion of psychology from the main currents of twentieth century 
sociology. The influential Talcott Parsons (1937) was persuaded partly by Durkheim in this 
and other respects. Instead of psychology, and in a manner highly reminiscent of Durkheim, 
Parsons emphasized the power of social norms. 
Some influential neoclassical economists also abandoned psychology at about the same 
time. Lionel Robbins (1932) recast economics as „the science of choice‟. Individual ends were 
taken as given, economics was to be all about the rational choice of appropriate means. 
Because individual preferences were taken as given, psychology no longer had a significant 
role in this reconstruction of the subject (Hodgson, 2001; Lewin, 1996). 
After their common rejection of psychological and other underpinnings, economics and 
sociology went their separate ways. Proclamations of methodological individualism were 
more prominent in economics, and of methodological collectivism in sociology. The social 
sciences faced an apparent dilemma between an Adam Smith-like and incentive-driven view 
of action, on the one hand, and a Durkheim-like and norm-propelled view, on the other. 
However, despite the century-long battle between methodological individualists and 
methodological collectivists, they have much more in common than is typically admitted. 
Methodological individualism conflates the social upon the individual, thus losing sight of 
key mechanisms of social influence, and is consequently impelled to take the purposes and 
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preferences of the individual as given. Methodological collectivism conflates the individual 
upon society and thereby lacks an explanation or adequate recognition of how individual 
purposes or preferences may be changed. The explanatory moves are different but the results 
are similar in some vital respects: there is no adequate explanation of how social institutions 
may reconstitute individual purposes and preferences. Typically, both approaches disregard 
the value and role of psychology in the explanation of social phenomena. Both methodologies 
end up with a diminished concept of social power, and an analytical over-emphasis on overt 
coercion and constraint, rather than more subtle mechanisms of social influence. 
3. Reductionism and Reduction 
In their stronger formulations, methodological individualism and methodological collectivism 
are both different versions of (explanatory) reductionism, which refers to the more general 
doctrine that all aspects of a complex phenomenon should be completely explained in terms 
of one level, or type of unit. Promoting such a strong definition of reductionism, Elster (1983, 
pp. 20-4) wrote: „Generally speaking, the scientific practice is to seek an explanation at a 
lower level than the explandum. ... The search for micro-foundations … is in reality a 
pervasive and omnipresent feature of science.‟ 
We can find many other versions of reductionism. Biological reductionism proposes that 
(social and other) phenomena should be explained solely in terms of biological characteristics. 
Physical reductionism requires that (biological, chemical or other) phenomena should be 
explained solely in terms of physics. Neurological reductionism proposes that psychic 
phenomena should be explained entirely in neurological terms. Methodological individualism 
pursues universal explanations of social phenomena in terms of individuals, and 
methodological collectivism the reverse. 
Taking Elster-style reductionism to its extreme, it proposes that phenomena should be 
explained in terms of the lowest type of unit. This would not support methodological 
individualism, because we can go lower than the individual. It would suggest explanations of 
individual characteristics in terms of biology, and so on. But where would it stop? Ultimately 
it would suggest that all explanations should be reduced to subatomic physics. This would 
mean the dissolution of all sciences except subatomic physics. Everything would have to be 
brought down and explained in its terms. There would be no mechanics, no thermodynamics, 
no chemistry, no biology and no social science. All sciences would be reduced to one. 
The reason why we have different sciences is that complete explanatory reduction is 
generally beyond reach, and multiple levels of explanation are both appropriate and powerful. 
Reductionist ambitions are at best, wildly optimistic, and at worst, dogmatic and diversionary. 
Reductionism should also be distinguished from reduction. Emphatically, some degree of 
reduction to elemental units is inevitable and desirable in science. Even measurement is an act 
of reduction. Science cannot proceed without some dissection and some analysis of parts. 
However, although some reduction is unavoidable, complete analytical reductions are 
generally impossible. They are beset by analytical explosions in the number of combinations 
of elements; they are cursed by the ubiquitous phenomenon of complexity. Complete 
analytical reductions are rarely, if ever, achieved. 
Reductionism cannot be wholly refuted in principle, because any explanatory deficit or 
limited explanatory reduction might sometime be remedied in the future. However, in no 
science are the canons of reductionism strictly enforced. Yet the sciences achieve results. 
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Although we can never be sure than someday a missing explanation will be found, and a 
further explanatory reduction might be possible, there is sufficient evidence from the sciences 
to undermine the full reductionist dogma and to diminish reductionist ambitions. While 
reduction is a worthwhile and important aim, the sciences do not need full reductionism to 
qualify as science. 
4. Structuration Theory and Central Conflation 
The „structuration theory‟ of Anthony Giddens (1984) is an attempt to steer a middle course 
between the extremes of both methodological individualism and methodological 
collectivism.5 He regards agent and structure as a „duality‟ where both human subjects and 
social institutions are jointly constituted in and through recurrent practices, and where no 
element has ontological or analytical priority over the other. Structure and agency are 
mutually and symmetrically constitutive of each other. 
Giddens (1982, p. 35) sees structures as „recursively organized rules and resources‟. 
Agency is both free and constrained. Human beings are reflective of, and reactive to, their 
circumstances, as well as being conditioned by them. Equally, instead of the prominent idea 
that the „structural properties of society form constraining influences over action ... 
structuration theory is based on the proposition that structure is always both enabling and 
constraining‟ (Giddens, 1984, p. 169). 
Agent and structure are regarded as different aspects of the same process. As Ian Craib 
(1992, pp. 3-4) put it in his commentary on Giddens, structure and agency are not treated as 
„separate and opposing things in the world or as mutually exclusive ways of thinking about 
the world‟ but as „simply two sides of the same coin. If we look at social practices in one way, 
we can see actors and actions; if we look at them in another way we can see structures.‟ Agent 
and structure are regarded as different facets of a unity.6 
In contrast, several philosophers have proposed a layered ontology. The idea is 
commonplace in the philosophy of science: reality is irreducibly layered, with physical, 
molecular, organic, mental, human individual and social levels.7 Everything belongs to a level 
and each level has, within bounds, some autonomy and stability. However, each layer is 
linked to, and dependent upon, other layers. Such a stratified ontology is essentially absent 
from structuration theory. The individual and the social levels are conflated into the central 
ground of the recursive structure. 
Essentially, in stratified ontologies, what separates one layer from another is the existence 
of emergent properties at the higher level. Units exist at higher levels that are not mere 
epiphenomena of lower-level units. A viable and irreducible hierarchical ontology depends 
upon the notion of emergent properties. A property may be said to be emergent if its existence 
                                                 
5 Related middle-way perspectives appear in organization studies, such as Chatman (1989) and Gerhart (2005). 
6 A very similar view was promoted by the American sociologist Cooley (1902), who influenced American 
institutionalists (Hodgson, 2004). 
7 See, for example, Ward (1903), Sellars (1926), Bunge (1973), Bhaskar (1975) and Weissman (2000). 
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and nature depend upon entities at a lower level, but the property is neither reducible to, nor 
predictable from, properties of entities found at the lower level.8 
Giddens has no explicit layered ontology and makes no explicit use of the ideas of 
emergent properties. For Giddens (1984, p. 171) neural entities „do not come together ex 
nihilo to form a new entity by fusion or association‟. A consequence of Giddens‟s rejection of 
emergent properties is not only the rejection of a higher and social level of analysis with their 
own emergent properties, but also the analytical neglect of the natural and physical world as 
the essential substratum and context of human activity. Structuration theory is forced to 
accept a single level of reality, with nothing (social or otherwise) „above‟ it, and nothing 
(natural or otherwise) „below‟. One consequence of this is the denudation of the concept of 
social structure. Another is the neglect of the natural and biological substratum of all human 
activity. 
If structuration theory accepts a singular plane of being, then where is it? Giddens is 
explicit about this. For him, „structure exists ... only in its instantiations of such [social] 
practices and as memory traces orienting the conduct of knowledgeable human agents‟ 
(Giddens, 1984, p. 17). Symptomatically, the formulation is repeated elsewhere: „Structure 
exists only as memory traces, the organic basis of human knowledgeability, and as 
instantiated in action‟ (op. cit., p. 377). And again, in another work, for Giddens (1989, p. 
256), structure „exists only in a virtual way, as memory traces and as the instantiation of rules 
in the situated activities of agents.‟ An agent carries „structural properties‟ in its memory, 
which may be transmitted through practice from one agent to another. Commentators on 
Giddens‟s theory thus observe that „if structures have a locus of existence, it is in the heads of 
social actors‟ (Craib, 1992, p. 42). Richard Kilminster (1991, p. 96) made a similar point: 
„“structure” in Giddens‟ theory is internal to actors‟. 
A problem with the idea that social structure is entirely mental and internal is that it 
downplays the fact that structure consists not merely of persons or things, but also of 
interactive relations between persons, in a social and material context. Individuals may 
confront these structures, even if they do not have the memories, ideas or habits that are 
associated with them.  
Giddens attempts to explain the persistence of social structures in terms of the centrality 
and persistence of routinized practice. For Giddens (1984, p. 60) routinization „provides the 
master key‟. But how can the existence of routinization itself be explained? Giddens‟s (p. 50) 
answer lies in his concept of „ontological security‟. This allegedly has its origins „in basic 
anxiety-controlling mechanisms‟ that in turn are acquired by the individual as a result of 
„predictable and caring routines established by parental figures‟. 
This argument has a strong functionalist flavour: the replication of routines is explained in 
terms of their function. The explanation for the persistence of routines is seen as the search for 
ontological security, which in turn results from the persistence of (parental) routines. 
However, no adequate explanation is given for the persistence of these „caring routines 
established by parental figures‟. These routines may be handed down from generation to 
                                                 
8 The concept of emergent properties was developed by the philosopher Lewes (1875), the psychologist and 
philosopher of biology Morgan (1923), and several others. For a history of the idea see Blitz (1992) and a recent 
defence see Humphreys (1997). Ward (1903) and others used the term „creative synthesis‟ rather than „emergent 
properties‟. See Hodgson (2004) for a discussion. 
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generation, but why would this be so? No adequate explanation of the origin or persistence of 
routines is given, and Giddens‟s discussion of ontological security does not provide it. 
Routinization is an important idea but Giddens‟ s explanation of it is inadequate. A similar 
stress on routinization is found in the „evolutionary economics‟ of Richard Nelson and Sidney 
Winter (1982). However, Giddens (1984, pp. 228-43) has been a critic of evolutionism in the 
social sciences and has rejected „evolutionary‟ ideas in that domain.9 
In their critiques of Giddens, Roy Bhaskar (1989) and Margaret Archer (1995) insist that 
human agents and structures are not different aspects of the same things or processes, but 
different entities. Although structures depend for their existence upon individuals, they are 
different and distinct. This separation stems from the fact that, for any particular actor, social 
structure always exists prior to her engagement with the world. Bhaskar (1989, p. 36) wrote 
that „people do not create society. For it always pre-exists them and is a necessary condition 
for their activity.‟ Hence any given individual is preceded by the social structures into which 
they are born. As Archer (1995, p. 72) put it: „This is the human condition, to be born into a 
social context (of language, beliefs and organization) which was not of our making‟. She 
criticized Giddens‟s structuration theory as a „central conflation‟ because it conflates structure 
and agency into processes acting together at a single level. 
However, the differentiation of structure from agent is valid if structure is seen as external 
to any given individual, but not if it is regarded as external to all individuals. Structure does 
not exist apart from all individuals, but it may exist apart from any given individual. Unless 
this distinction is given sufficient stress, the concept of structure may be reified. 
5. A Missing Link 
While the Archer-Bhaskar critical realist approach is an important advance, it has some 
problems. While there is an account of structural change, there is as yet no account of how 
individuals are changed. We are told how structures evolve, but there is no parallel 
explanation of the changes to individuals. Individual agency is rightly retained and 
emphasized. Bhaskar (1989, p. 80) and other critical realists argue that „intentional human 
behaviour is caused‟ but „it is always caused by reasons, and that it is only because it is 
caused by reasons that it is properly characterized as intentional.‟ But in critical realism there 
is no adequate explanation of the causes of reasons or beliefs. So far, the account of agency in 
critical realism is incomplete (Faulkner, 2002). 
Bhaskar (1975, pp. 70-1) endorses an „ubiquity determinism‟, meaning that every event is 
caused. Yet critical realism has so far failed to apply this universal principle to individual 
reasons or beliefs. It recognizes that beliefs are part of social reality, but gives no account of 
the cultural, psychological or physiological causes of beliefs or reasons themselves. In critical 
realism so far there is no explanation of how individual agents acquire or change their beliefs, 
                                                 
9 Giddens (1979, p. 233) described evolution as „social change as the progressive emergence of traits that a 
particular type of society is presumed to have within itself from its inception‟. This non-Darwinian and 
„unfolding‟ conception of evolution is very different from the evolutionary economics of Veblen (1919) or of 
Nelson and Winter (1982). These latter accounts see economic evolution as an ongoing, imperfect and non-
teleological process of competitive selection, acting upon a varied population of institutions, habits, customs and 
routines. Evolution in this conception is not necessarily progressive, and is invulnerable to Giddens‟s critique. 
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reasons, purposes or preferences. The possibility of such changes may be admitted, but as yet 
there is no indication in critical realism of how such changes may be explained. 
The position of Bhaskar (1989) and Archer (1995) is a case of non-conflation but 
incomplete explanation. There is no explanation, even in principle, of the origin of reasons or 
beliefs. However, this limitation is not unique to critical realism: many other approaches in 
social science share this defect. 
With this omission, a temptation is to adopt a schema in which structure somehow channels 
individual activity with a sufficiency to explain it, thus putting the emphasis on the role of 
structures as constraints on individuals.10 Without an account of how individual intentions or 
preferences may change, a danger is to rely on structural constraints to do the main work of 
explaining human behaviour. The disconnection of agency and structure may end up 
explaining the individual solely by reference to structure, thus conflating the individual into 
the structure, as criticized above. 
The opposite temptation is to tack the subjective preferences or purposes of individuals as 
the rock bottom – the ultimate explanatory factors. Without an analysis of how preferences, 
purposes or beliefs are caused, the temptation is to revert to either individualist or structuralist 
extremes. 
Taking the given individual as the fundamental unit of analysis, many economists reject the 
idea of explaining individual preferences. For example, Friedrich Hayek (1948, p. 67) wrote: 
„If conscious action can be “explained,” this is a task for psychology but not for economics ... 
or any other social science‟. Like many others, Hayek shunned one of the central problems of 
social science – to explain human motivation. 
Likewise, methodologically collectivist attempts to explain individuals exclusively in terms 
of social structures also typically fail to provide an adequate account of human motivation. It 
is often simply assumed that roles or cultures or institutions affect individuals, without 
explaining how such social structures work their magic on individual motivations. Some have 
turned to behaviourist psychology, in the belief that its mechanisms of stimulus and response 
provide the answer. But behaviourism fails to address the inner springs of cognition and 
deliberation, overlooks the fact that beliefs are part of social reality. It makes the agent a 
puppet of its social environment. 
In contrast, with a causal and psychological explanation of how structures can affect or 
mould individual purposes or preferences, then the role of the individual can be placed 
alongside that of structure and becomes part of a fuller, two-way explanation. The spiral of 
causation from structure to individual, and from individual to structure, does not deny 
individuality; but it places the individual in his or her proper place within the ongoing process 
of social transformation. 
6. The Nature and Role of Habits 
What is required is a framework within which the transformation of both individuals and 
structures can be explained. This approach must involve explanations of possible causal 
interaction and reconstitution, from both individual to structure and from structure to 
                                                 
10 An example is the Marxian idea that the behaviour of the capitalist is determined entirely and with little 
variation by the need to survive in a competitive market. For a critique see Hodgson (1999). 
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individual. This would mean an explanation of the evolution of individual purposes and 
beliefs, as well as an explanation of the evolution of structures. Preferences or purposes would 
be endogenously formed. Their co-evolution must be examined, without conflating one into 
the other. Such an evolutionary analysis provides the means by which social theory may 
escape from its unsustainable dichotomies and make further progress. 
Pragmatist philosophers and institutional economists in the Veblenian tradition argue that 
institutions work only because the rules involved are embedded in prevalent habits of thought 
and behaviour (Veblen, 1899; Dewey, 1922; Joas, 1996; Twomey, 1998; Kilpinen, 2000). In 
the social sciences, the concept of habit was robbed of most of its significance as a result of 
the rise of behaviourist psychology. Failing to acknowledge propensities, behaviourism 
treated habit as behaviour. In contrast, Veblen and the pragmatist philosophers regarded habit 
as an acquired proclivity or capacity, which may not be actually expressed in current 
behaviour. As John Dewey (1922, p. 42) put it: „The essence of habit is an acquired 
predisposition to ways or modes of response.‟ Repeated behaviour is important in establishing 
a habit. But habit and behaviour are not the same. If we acquire a habit we do not necessarily 
use it all the time. Many habits are unconscious. Habits are submerged repertoires of potential 
thought or behaviour, to be triggered by an appropriate stimulus or context.  
Many have difficulty with the idea of habit as a disposition. A source of the problem is a 
reluctance to remove reason and belief from the exclusive driving seat of human action. The 
„mind-first‟ conception of action pervades social science. If habits affect behaviour then it is 
wrongly feared that reason and belief will be dethroned. The concern is that volition would be 
replaced by mechanism. However, from a pragmatist perspective, reasons and beliefs 
themselves depend upon habits of thought. Habits act as filters of experience and the 
foundations of intuition and interpretation. Habit is the grounding of both reflective and non-
reflective behaviour. This does not make belief, reason or will any less important or real. 
The formation of habits requires repeated behaviours, which sometimes are triggered by 
innate dispositions, and often result from the propensity to imitate others in social conditions 
with guiding constraints. Repeated behaviour leads to the formation of habits of thought or 
action. Habit is the psychological mechanism that forms the basis of much rule-following 
behaviour. 
For a habit to acquire the status of a rule, it has to acquire some inherent normative content, 
to be potentially codifiable, and to be prevalent among a group. The prevailing rule structure 
provides incentives and constraints for individual actions. Channelling behaviour in this way, 
accordant habits are further developed and reinforced among the population. Hence the rule 
structure helps to create habits and preferences that are consistent with its reproduction. 
Habits are the constitutive material of institutions, providing them with enhanced durability, 
power and normative authority. In turn, by reproducing shared habits of thought, institutions 
create strong mechanisms of conformism and normative agreement. 
As Charles Sanders Peirce (1878, p. 294) declared, the „essence of belief is the 
establishment of habit‟. Habit is not the negation of deliberation, but its necessary foundation. 
Reasons and beliefs are often the rationalizations of deep-seated feelings and emotions that 
spring from habits laid down by repeated behaviours (Kilpinen, 2000; Ouellette and Wood, 
1998; Wood et al., 2002). Such dispositions and emotions are integral to decision-making 
(Damasio, 1994). This interplay of behaviour, habit, emotion and rationalization helps to 
explain the normative power of custom in human society. 
Habits are acquired in a social context and not genetically transmitted. By accepting the 
foundational role of habit in sustaining rule-following behaviour, we can begin to build an 
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alternative ontology of institutions, in which we avoid the conceptual problems of an account 
based primarily on intentionality. This is not to deny the importance of intentionality, but to 
regard it as a consequence as much as a cause, and to place it in the broader and ubiquitous 
context of other, non-deliberative behaviours.11 
7. Reconstitutive Downward Causation 
Everyone accepts that institutions depend for their existence upon individuals, and it is 
sometimes possible for individuals to change institutions. This could be described as „upward 
causation‟. More controversially, by structuring, constraining and enabling individual 
behaviours, institutions have the power to mould the dispositions and behaviours of agents in 
fundamental ways; they have a capacity to change aspirations, instead of merely enabling or 
constraining them. Habit is the key mechanism in this transformation. Institutions are social 
structures that can involve reconstitutive downward causation, acting to some degree upon 
individual habits of thought and action (March and Olsen, 1989; Hodgson, 2003, 2004).12 
The existence of reconstitutive downward causation does not mean that institutions directly, 
entirely or uniformly determine individual aspirations, merely that there can be significant 
downward effects. Insofar is institutions lead to regularities of behaviour, concordant habits 
are laid down among the population, leading to congruent purposes and beliefs. In this way 
the institutional structure is further sustained. 
Because institutions simultaneously depend upon the activities of individuals and constrain 
and mould them, through this positive feedback they have strong self-reinforcing and self-
perpetuating characteristics. Institutions are perpetuated not simply through the convenient 
coordination rules that they offer. They are also perpetuated because they confine and mould 
individual aspirations, and create a foundation for their existence upon the many individual 
minds that they taint with their conventions. 
This does not mean, however, that institutions stand separately from the group of 
individuals involved; institutions depend for their existence on individuals. Nevertheless, any 
single individual is born into a pre-existing institutional world, which confronts him or her 
with its rules and norms. The institutions that we face reside in the dispositions of other 
individuals, but also depend on the structured interactions between them, often also involving 
material artefacts or instruments. History provides the resources and constraints, in each case 
both material and cognitive, in which we think, act and create. 
Accordingly, institutions are simultaneously both objective structures „out there‟, and 
subjective springs of human agency „in the human head‟. Institutions are in this respect like 
Klein bottles: the subjective „inside‟ is simultaneously the objective „outside‟. The institution 
thus offers a link between the ideal and the real. The twin concepts of habit and institution 
help to overcome the philosophical dilemma between realism and subjectivism in social 
science. Actor and institutional structure, although distinct, are thus connected in a circle of 
mutual interaction and interdependence. 
                                                 
11 The dispositional treatment of habit here is broadly consistent with Vanberg‟s (2002) concept of „program-
based‟ activity, which he insists must be rendered consistent with our knowledge of human evolution. 
12 The term „downward causation‟ has its own history (Campbell, 1974; Sperry, 1991, Emmeche et al. 2000). 
The meaning of the added word „reconstitutive‟ is explained below. 
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The crucial role of habit is illuminated in what is perhaps the first computer simulation of 
extensive interaction between agents and structures, where the preferences of agents are 
altered by institutional circumstances just as institutions are developed by agents (Hodgson 
and Knudsen, 2004a). This is an agent-based simulation of the emergence of a traffic 
convention to drive on the left or the right side of the road. The simulations show that strength 
of habit and processes of habituation play a vital role alongside rational deliberation and 
selection pressure. This not only raises important questions concerning the role of habit in 
decision-making but also it challenges the frequent assumption that preference functions 
should always be taken entirely as exogenously given. 
Habit removes some actions from conscious deliberation. However, the model suggests that 
there is something more to habit than economizing on decision-making. The model shows that 
a crucial role played by habit is to build up and reinforce an enduring disposition in each 
agent, concerning the appropriate side of the road on which to drive. The development of 
habits amounts to an element of endogenous preference formation. A sequence of repeated 
behaviours creates in each agent a habitual predilection, which can stimulate a „belief‟ or 
„conviction‟ that a particular behavior is appropriate. The evolution of a convention in the 
model depends largely on one set of stubborn „beliefs‟ triumphing over the other. Once a 
stable convention forms, it is encoded in the dispositions of the majority and it can resist the 
intrusion of a substantial amount of erratic behavior. Accordingly, habit is a means by which 
social conventions and institutions are formed and preserved. 
The model also provides a framework to consider the nuanced interpretations and meanings 
of the concept of „downward causation‟, which has weak and strong forms (Sperry, 1991; 
Emmeche et al., 2000; Hodgson, 2003). In our model, this weaker form of downward 
causation is clearly present, where evolutionary selection acts on the population of agents, 
causing a shift in the characteristics of the population as a whole. For any individual agent, 
evolutionary selection does not cause a change in the values of the fixed parameters. 
In our model, a stronger form of downward causation is also present. More and more 
surviving cars develop the habit to drive on the left or the right, according to the emerging 
convention. Habits are part of the preferences of each agent and they change with experience. 
In this way, emerging and enduring systemic properties reconstitute „downwards‟ the 
preferences of the agent. This causal mechanism amounts to reconstitutive downward 
causation. Part of the achievement here is to show that both forms of downward causation can 
be represented in an agent-based model. 
Reconstitutive downward causation does not mean that social laws or forces can overturn 
the principles governing the operation of human mental and physical activity at the level of 
the individual. Nobel Laureate Roger Sperry (1991, p. 230) insists on a similar condition: „the 
higher-level phenomena in exerting downward control do not disrupt or intervene in the 
causal relations of the downward-level component activity‟. This could usefully be termed 
Sperry‟s Rule. It ensures that emergence, although it is associated with emergent causal 
powers at a higher level, does not generate multiple types or forms of causality at any single 
level. Any emergent causes at higher levels exist by virtue of lower-level causal processes.13 
Adherence to Sperry‟s Rule excludes any version of methodological collectivism or holism 
where an attempt is made to explain individual dispositions or behaviour entirely in terms of 
                                                 
13 This version of „reconstitutive‟ downward causation is consistent with the „medium‟ conditions of viability 
advanced by Emmeche et al. (2000). 
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institutions or other system-level characteristics. Instead, Sperry‟s Rule obliges us to explain 
particular human behaviour in terms of causal processes operating at the individual level, such 
as individual aspirations, dispositions or constraints. Where higher-level factors enter, it is in 
the more general explanation of the system-wide processes giving rise to those aspirations, 
dispositions or constraints. 
Another crucial point is to recognize the specific mechanism by which reconstitutive 
downward causation operates. It is on habits, rather than merely on behavior, intentions or 
other preferences. Clearly, the definitional distinction between habit (as a propensity or 
disposition) and behavior (or action) is essential to make sense of this statement. 
The existence of a viable mechanism of reconstitutive downward causation contrasts with 
other, untenable „top down‟ explanations in the social sciences where there are unspecified 
„cultural‟ or „economic‟ forces controlling individuals. Crucially, the mechanism of 
reconstitutive downward causation that is outline here affects the dispositions, thoughts and 
actions of human actors. Hence this model illustrates the Veblenian process by which 
emergent institutions work on individual habits and give rise to new preferences and 
intentions. 
8. Concluding Remarks 
Much of the discussion above has focused on institutions, rather than the more general form 
of structures. Because institutions are rule systems of some durability, they permit the 
formation of habits and open up the possibility of reconstitutive downward causation. In turn, 
organizations are a special type of institution, with additional characteristics. In what respect 
do these additional characteristics enhance the picture, and what are some of the implications?  
Organizations are bounded institutions with a relatively high degree of cohesion.14 Their 
characteristics of membership, sovereignty and responsibility enhance the possibilities for 
more intensive interactions between individuals and organizations. Organizations such as the 
family and the firm affect our lives in intimate and profound ways. They carry a richer 
repertoire of mechanisms and opportunities for creating habits and thereby altering 
preferences and beliefs. The other side of the coin is that organizations themselves depend on 
the existence of a complex of habits relating to rules concerning membership, sovereignty and 
responsibility.  
A practical outcome is that any attempt to create or develop an organization, or to change 
its strategy, partly but necessarily involves the development of accordant individual habits. 
The psychological mechanism of habit is something much more specific than the often vague 
concept of organizational culture. An upshot of the approach promoted here is to focus more 
specifically on the processes of habit formation. 
Nelson and Winter (1982) and others emphasize that organizations embody routines 
involving skills that lead to patterns of behaviour. A routine is a generative structure or 
capacity within an organization. Routines are organizational dispositions to energize 
conditional patterns of behaviour within an organized group of individuals, involving 
sequential responses to cues. 
                                                 
14 Formal conditions of such cohesion and some implications for the theory of organizational evolution are laid 
out in Hodgson and Knudsen (2004b). 
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What are the psychological mechanisms involved? Psychology makes a distinction between 
procedural and other, more cognitive forms of memory, such as semantic, episodic or 
declarative memory (Cohen and Bacdayan, 1994). Procedural memory is triggered by 
preceding events and stimuli. Organizational routines depend upon a structured group of 
individuals, each with habits of a particular kind, where many of these habits depend upon 
procedural memory.15 
The behavioural cues by some members of a structured assembly of habituated individuals 
triggers specific habits in others. Hence various individual habits sustain each other in an 
interlocking structure of reciprocating individual behaviours. Together these behaviours take 
on collective qualities associated with teams. Both individuals and structures are involved 
throughout. The organization or group provides a structured social and physical environment 
for each individual, including rules and norms of behaviour, of both the explicit and the 
informal kind. This environment is made up of the other individuals, the relations between 
them and the technological and physical artefacts that they may use in their interactions. This 
social and physical environment enables, stimulates and channels individual activities, which 
in turn can help trigger the behaviour of others, produce or modify some artefacts, and help to 
change or replicate parts of this social and physical environment. 
Individuals have habits; groups have routines. Routines are the organizational analogue of 
habits. But routines do not simply refer to habits that are shared by many individuals in an 
organization or group. If this were the case there would be no need for the additional concept 
of a routine. Routines are irreducible to habits alone: they are organizational meta-habits, 
existing on a substrate of habituated individuals in a social structure. Routines are one 
ontological layer above habits themselves. 
Partly because of procedural memory, organizations can have important additional 
properties and capacities that are not possessed by individuals, taken severally (Argyris and 
Schön, 1996; Levitt and March, 1988). The organization provides the social and physical 
environment that is necessary to enable specific activities, cue individual habits and deploy 
individual memories. If one person leaves the organization and is replaced by another, then 
the new recruit may have to learn the habits that are required to maintain specific routines. 
Just as the human body has a life in addition to its constituent cells, the organization thus has 
a life in addition to its members. Generally, the organizational whole is greater than the sum 
of the properties its individual members, taken severally. The additional properties of the 
whole stem from the structured relations and causal interactions between the individuals 
involved. This is a central proposition in the emergentist tradition of philosophy and social 
theory (Blitz, 1992; Kontopoulos, 1993; Hodgson, 2004; Wiessman, 2000). 
Organizations are relatively cohesive entities that often compete with other organizations 
for scarce resources. Organizational evolution involves the development and reproduction of 
organizational routines and accordant individual habits. Following evolutionary economists 
such as Richard Nelson and Sidney Winter (1982) and organization scientists such as Howard 
Aldrich (1999) this opens up the possibility of an evolutionary approach. Despite an aversion 
among some social scientists to ideas taken from biology, it has been demonstrated that 
evolutionary ideas are extremely powerful in this regard. Veblen (1899, 1919) was one of the 
first social scientists to pioneer an evolutionary approach with a strong Darwinian inspiration. 
At a suitably abstract level, evolutionary theory offer a general framework for understanding 
                                                 
15 See Becker (2004) for a review of the literature on routines. 
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both persistence and change in a population of units, including organizations. It is here that 
evolutionary economics, Veblenian institutionalism and organization science all converge, 
creating a lively agenda for future enquiry.16 
                                                 
16 Nevertheless, important differences of viewpoint exist. Aldrich (1999) embraces Darwinian terminology, but 
it is implicit rather than explicit in Nelson and Winter (1982). Hodgson and Knudsen (2006) and others argue 
that a Darwinian framework is essential to understand the evolution of organizations. Hodgson and Knudsen 
(forthcoming) also deal with the problems and ambiguities surrounding the misleading use of the „Lamarckian‟ 
label to describe socio-economic evolution. This has a bearing on contributions to organization science, 
including Hannan and Freeman (1989) and Usher and Evans (1996). 
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